The victim's testimony in criminal proceedings: how much evidentiary value it has
In many criminal proceedings, such as assaults, sexual offences, gender-based violence or harassment, the only direct witness to the events is the victim themselves: there are no recordings, no other witnesses, no conclusive forensic evidence. Can a conviction be based solely on their statement? The Supreme Court's answer is yes, but with demanding conditions.
The starting point of Spanish case law is that the victim's statement constitutes valid incriminating evidence and may be sufficient on its own to convict, without the need for other elements to corroborate it. If corroboration were always mandatory, offences committed in private, precisely the most serious ones, would in fact go unpunished. But this does not mean that any statement is automatically credible: the court must subject the testimony to a rigorous analysis, and if reasonable doubts arise, the result must be acquittal by application of in dubio pro reo.
The Supreme Court has developed a system of assessment criteria, which are not a mathematical formula but guidelines for analysis. The first is the absence of subjective incredibility: checking whether there is any objective reason, such as animosity, prior litigation or economic interests, that would raise suspicion that the accusation is false or distorted. The second is objective plausibility: the internal coherence of the account and its compatibility with the circumstances of the case, since an account that changes substantially in essential aspects loses reliability. The third is persistence in the incrimination: the testimony must be maintained continuously, without the core elements of who, what, when, where and how varying, although peripheral details may vary.
To this is added peripheral corroboration: although it is not indispensable, the existence of other elements that support the account, such as a forensic report, prior messages or collateral witnesses, notably reinforces its credibility, and its absence requires greater rigour in the other criteria.
The defence has the right to question the victim and to challenge their account, within the right of confrontation, although it must exercise it with sensitivity and respect, especially where there is trauma; humiliating cross-examinations are ethically questionable and are usually counterproductive. The strategy must be based on objective evidence, not on personal disparagement. It is worth distinguishing essential contradictions, which affect the identity of the aggressor or the nature and timing of the events, from peripheral ones, compatible with the fragility of memory.
In offences of special sensitivity the assessment is more delicate: in sexual assaults, solid peripheral corroboration is usually required when the account presents inconsistencies; in gender-based violence, the victim's retraction does not automatically extinguish responsibility and prior statements may be assessed; and when the victim is a minor, their statement is taken through a video-recorded forensic interview to avoid secondary victimisation. Retraction poses a complex situation: the court must assess with the same rigour the initial accusation and the subsequent denial, and if the retraction is due to pressure or fear, the original version may prevail.
In short, the victim's testimony can sustain a conviction, but only when it passes a demanding critical analysis; if a reasonable doubt remains, that doubt benefits the accused.
