National Security Concerns Require Stricter Screening of PRC Students
Canada has long valued openness in its immigration and education systems. International students contribute to academic exchange, cultural understanding, and economic growth. At the same time, credible public reporting and government assessments have raised concerns that Canada is also a target of espionage by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Study permits granted to some PRC nationals may, in certain circumstances, be used as an entry point for activities that raise national security concerns, particularly where security screening has not kept pace with evolving risks.
Since the early 1970s, Canada has encouraged academic exchanges with the PRC, particularly in science and technology. As reported by The Walrus on June 4, 2024, this policy was initially framed as a goodwill initiative that allowed Chinese students to access advanced training in Canada while Canadian students studied language, culture, and politics in China. For many years, these exchanges were widely viewed as mutually beneficial. By the early 2000s, however, observers began to note a shift in how some of these academic pathways were being used.
An October 30, 2018 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “Picking flowers, making honey,” described a covert program under which engineers and scientists linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concealed their military affiliations in order to gain access to postgraduate research programs abroad, including in Canada. According to ASPI, this strategy involved individuals affiliated with the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) and other military-linked institutions. What had once appeared to be conventional academic collaboration increasingly raised concerns about state-directed intelligence gathering.
Despite growing awareness of industrial and research espionage risks, the number of PRC students admitted to Canadian universities continued to rise, with limited evidence of a corresponding increase in security vetting. Universities, facing financial pressures, have often relied heavily on international tuition revenues. As a result, applications were frequently approved in large numbers without a tailored assessment of potential national security implications.
A 2018 paper by the International Cyber Policy Centre in Australia identified Canada as the third most targeted country by PLA military scientists, after the United States and the United Kingdom. A study by U.S.-based intelligence firm Strider Technologies, reported by The Globe and Mail in January 2023, found that researchers linked to the Chinese military had successfully targeted approximately 50 Canadian universities. The University of Waterloo reportedly had the highest number of collaborations with NUDT, followed by institutions such as the University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University, the University of Victoria, McMaster University, Concordia University, and the University of Calgary. Over a five-year period, researchers from Canada’s top ten universities co-authored 240 papers with Chinese military scientists.
These findings appear to have had limited impact on how Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) assesses study permit applications. As of October 2024, approximately 50,785 PRC nationals were studying in Canada on valid permits. In a notable December 2023 decision, the Federal Court upheld the refusal of a study permit for Yuekang Li, a Chinese PhD applicant accepted by the University of Waterloo. The Court found that his proposed research in microfluidics—a field with both civilian and military applications—could pose a national security risk, particularly given his connections to institutions linked to China’s military. While this decision highlighted the risks associated with sensitive research areas, it did not signal a broader policy shift in screening PRC study permit applicants.
Other Western countries have taken more assertive steps. In 2020, the United States expanded visa restrictions on individuals linked to NUDT. A December 21, 2021 report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) noted that, following these restrictions, some Chinese scholarship recipients began concealing military ties and reframing their research interests to appear less sensitive while still offering potential military value. These findings suggest a level of sophistication that challenges traditional immigration screening methods.
Public reporting in the United States has also drawn attention to covert activity on university campuses. In a May 2025 interview, China analyst Gordon G. Chang warned that Chinese diplomatic and intelligence operatives have allegedly coerced students abroad into sharing research data, sometimes by threatening family members in China. A May 2025 investigation by The Stanford Review described an alleged intelligence-gathering operation involving an individual posing as a student to access sensitive research and assess political loyalty among Chinese nationals on campus. According to that investigation, platforms such as WeChat were used to monitor and direct activities, and students faced pressure to comply.
One factor amplifying these concerns is the PRC’s legal framework. Under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, all Chinese citizens and organizations are required to support and cooperate with state intelligence work upon request, regardless of where they reside. Subsequent legislation, including the Data Security Law (2021) and the amended Counterespionage Law (2023), extends these obligations and enforcement mechanisms beyond China’s borders. Independent research organizations, such as CNA, have reported that Chinese authorities may exert pressure on citizens abroad by targeting family members who remain in China.
This legal context has implications for Canadian research institutions, particularly where partnerships involve PRC-linked companies. Huawei Technologies’ extensive research funding in Canada has been the subject of public debate. Between 2014 and 2019, Huawei invested close to $60 million in Canadian university research, forming partnerships with at least seventeen institutions. The University of Waterloo alone received more than $15 million to fund multiple projects. In addition to research funding, Huawei supplied network equipment to Canadian telecommunications providers. Whether these activities amount to a security threat is subject to interpretation, but they underscore the importance of clear government guidance and risk assessment.
Allied countries have responded to similar concerns by adopting targeted legislative and policy measures. Australia’s Foreign Relations Act 2020 allows the federal government to review and cancel certain foreign agreements involving universities. The United States has imposed visa restrictions on individuals associated with specific PRC-linked institutions. The United Kingdom’s National Security and Investment Act empowers the government to block or unwind investments in sensitive sectors on national security grounds. These measures aim to manage risk while preserving academic freedom and due process.
Canada has taken steps to strengthen research security through legislation and policy, but these initiatives largely focus on domestic research partnerships rather than immigration screening. In June 2024, Parliament passed Bill C-70, the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA), which requires registration of certain arrangements with foreign principals involving political or public communication activities. The federal government has also implemented the Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern and reinforced the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships. These frameworks reflect an increased awareness of foreign interference risks, yet they do not directly address how PRC study permit applicants are assessed before arrival.
At present, Canada’s immigration system does not appear to apply sufficiently tailored safeguards to prevent study permits from being misused for activities inconsistent with their stated purpose, or to address the risk that some students may be compelled to cooperate with foreign intelligence services. Balancing national security with Canada’s longstanding openness to international students requires a more nuanced approach.
Several policy measures warrant consideration. IRCC could expand and deepen background checks for applicants seeking to study in fields with potential military or dual-use applications, such as engineering, computer science, biotechnology, and advanced materials. Applications that indicate elevated risk—such as prior affiliations with military or state-linked institutions, involvement in sensitive research, or close family ties to government entities—could be referred for enhanced review. Advanced data analysis tools may assist in identifying patterns of concern, while maintaining case-by-case assessments to support fairness and procedural integrity.
Post-arrival compliance measures are also important. Educational institutions should meet clear reporting obligations confirming enrolment status and adherence to study permit conditions, and ensure that campus facilities are not used for unauthorized or undisclosed research. Although Canada does not impose country-specific bans, applying heightened scrutiny to applicants from jurisdictions identified as higher risk is consistent with existing national security practices and international norms.
Canada’s challenge is not whether to remain open to international students, but how to ensure that openness does not unintentionally expose critical research and infrastructure to misuse. A more integrated approach between immigration screening and research security would better align Canada’s immigration policies with its national security objectives.
