On June 22, 2026, Governor Hobbs signed HB2995, the “Alec and Lydia Act,” into law. Because the legislation carries an emergency clause, the changes took effect immediately. Arizona’s family court domestic violence framework is now fundamentally different from what it was the day before.
The bottom line for anyone with a family law matter involving domestic violence: if a court finds that a parent committed domestic violence, there is now a mandatory presumption that awarding that parent any legal decision-making or parenting time is contrary to the child’s best interests. Not just decision-making authority. Any parenting time. And the presumption is mandatory.
This article explains the new framework and what it means for your case. Whether the new law applies to cases that were already pending when it took effect is a separate question addressed in Part 3 of this series.
Why This Law Exists
Alec and Lydia Mater were children killed by their father during court-ordered parenting time following his divorce from their mother. Before that tragedy, the father had exhibited psychiatric issues, including reports of suicidal threats and threatening behavior. Despite those warning signs, he was granted unsupervised parenting time. Their deaths, and his own subsequent suicide, gave this law its name and its urgency.
The legislature responded by completely rewriting A.R.S. § 25-403.03, the statute governing domestic violence in custody and parenting time cases.
The New Framework
The prior law required courts to categorize domestic violence before deciding what presumption, if any, applied. That framework is gone. Under the new law, a single rule applies: once a court finds that a parent committed domestic violence, a mandatory rebuttable presumption arises that awarding that parent any legal decision-making or parenting time is contrary to the child’s best interests.
“Mandatory” means courts cannot weigh the domestic violence finding against other best-interest factors before addressing the presumption. The presumption attaches first. The parent who committed domestic violence then bears the burden of overcoming it.
The law also establishes as express public policy, overriding the general presumption in A.R.S. § 25-103 that both parents should have frequent and meaningful contact with their children, that domestic violence is contrary to a child’s best interests and that the safety and well-being of the child and the victim are the highest priority.
Eight Changes Every Client Needs to Know
The presumption now covers parenting time, not just legal decision-making.
Under the old law, a domestic violence finding triggered a rebuttable presumption against awarding legal decision-making to the offending parent; parenting time was not directly covered. The new law extends the presumption to both. A parent who is found to have committed domestic violence faces a presumption against any parenting time with the children until that presumption is overcome.
Corroboration is not required.
The new law expressly states that corroboration from exhibits or a witness other than the victim is not required to establish domestic violence. A victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient by a preponderance of the evidence. Accused parents can no longer rely on a lack of corroborating witnesses as a procedural shield.
Prior acts are broadly admissible.
Evidence of domestic violence against any person, including acts previously litigated, events predating the last court order, or conduct that could have been raised in earlier proceedings, is now admissible when it tends to prove coercive control. Procedural defenses based on timing or prior litigation are substantially narrowed.
The mutual combat safe harbor is eliminated.
Previously, if both parents committed acts of domestic violence, the presumption was neutralized for both. Courts must now determine which parent’s conduct and motivation were more serious and apply the presumption to that parent. True mutual violence (with the presumption applying to both) requires a finding that both parents acted without justification to a similar degree and inflicted similar injury. Defensive conduct is expressly excluded from the definition of domestic violence.
Written findings are required at every stage, including temporary orders.
Courts must now issue specific, detailed written findings addressing: (1) what evidence supported or prevented a domestic violence finding; (2) why a parent who committed domestic violence did or did not rebut the presumption; and (3) why the court’s chosen protective measures are in the child’s best interests. These requirements apply at the temporary orders stage, not just at final trial, which changes the strategic weight of early hearings.
Rebuttal requires much more than a completed treatment program.
A certificate of completion from a batterers’ intervention program is no longer sufficient on its own to rebut the presumption. The offending parent must also waive the privilege protecting their treatment records (making those records available to both the court and the victim), demonstrate that the program was relevant and proportionate to the specific violence at issue, show an understanding of how their conduct harmed the child and the other parent, and provide evidence the program addressed any tendency to minimize or rationalize the violence. For unsupervised parenting time or legal decision-making, the standard is clear and convincing evidence.
Three familiar arguments are now expressly irrelevant.
Courts must disregard the following when evaluating the presumption: the fact that the child was not present when domestic violence occurred; the child’s unawareness that violence happened; and the child’s preference for maintaining or increasing contact with the parent who committed domestic violence. All three were commonly raised under the prior framework.
Domestic violence now includes coercive control.
The new law adds a comprehensive definition of “coercive control,” covering a pattern of violent, threatening, coercive, or emotionally abusive conduct, that reaches well beyond physical violence. Financial monitoring, isolation from family and friends, harassment, surveillance, and the use of litigation itself as a tool of control are now explicitly included. Part 2 of this series addresses coercive control in depth.
A Note on Pending Cases
If your case was already in court before June 22, 2026, which law applies to your matter is a distinct question. At least one Maricopa County judicial officer has found that HB2995 does not apply retroactively to pending cases, based on the principle in A.R.S. § 1-244 that no statute is retroactive unless expressly declared. That ruling does not bind other courts, and the issue remains open statewide. Part 3 of this series covers the retroactivity question in full.
Open Questions
Courts have not yet worked out what constitutes a sufficient “pattern” of coercive control, how competing mutual allegations will be evaluated when both parties claim defensive conduct, or how the new treatment and rebuttal requirements will apply in practice. Legal commentators have also identified potential constitutional questions the statute may face, including due process and First Amendment concerns. These will develop through litigation in the months and years ahead.
