Recognized by the publication, The Best Lawyers in America®, since 1995 as one of the top attorneys in the country, Robert R. Sheldon is an acknowledged expert in personal injury law and workers' compensation law. He serves on the State of Connecticut Workers' Compensation Legal Advisory Board. He has successfully argued cases before the Connecticut Appellate Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court and assisted in the enactment of legislation that has expanded the rights of injured workers in the state.
Mr. Sheldon received his Bachelor of Arts degree from the College of the Holy Cross and his Doctor of Jurisprudence from the University of Connecticut School of Law. He has practiced law since 1974 with this firm, specializing in personal injury law, legal malpractice, and workers' compensation law. He is also one of the rare attorneys in the area willing to take on cases against other attorneys. Mr. Sheldon has steadfastly held attorneys to the highest standard of care in dealing with their clients, successfully suing lawyers who violate their oath. By overcoming significant legal barriers, Mr. Sheldon has collected millions of dollars for victims of legal malpractice, personal injury, and workplace accidents.
Mr. Sheldon has served as president of the Board of Governors of the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association and frequently contributes to its continuing legal education programs. The American Board of Trial Advocates has also selected Mr. Sheldon for membership, which is limited to top trial lawyers in the country who are vigorously engaged in civil litigation. He is a member of the American Association for Justice, the Connecticut Bar Association, and the Greater Bridgeport Bar Association. He has continually served at the request of judges as a Trial Referee in state courts and as a Special Master in Federal Court.
The governor acknowledged the respect with which he is held in the legal community by appointing him to the State Judicial Review Council, a body that evaluates complaints against Connecticut judges and workers' compensation commissioners. He has been recognized by Connecticut Super Lawyers® in the field of plaintiff's personal injury and workers' compensation and is AV Rated by Martindale-Hubbell (the highest possible rating for a lawyer).
Mendes v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 212 Conn. 652 (1989) — In this case, the Connecticut Supreme Court voided as contrary to public policy an "escape clause" in an automobile insurance policy that permitted either party to the contract to demand a trial de novo when an uninsured or underinsured motorist arbitration award exceeded the minimum limits ($20,000) mandated by the Connecticut Financial Responsibility Act. The court unanimously found that this provision unfairly favored the insurer and was therefore invalid and unenforceable. Our highest court also noted that the clause could be used as leverage by an insurance carrier to coerce a claimant who received an arbitration award in excess of $20,000 to accept a compromise or settlement less than the amount awarded upon the threat of a demand for a trial de novo.
Safeco Insurance Companies v. Vetre, 174 Conn. 329 (1978) — This case permitted, for the first time in Connecticut, an injured insured to aggregate or "stack" the separate coverages afforded by the uninsured motorists endorsements of a single policy of insurance covering two vehicles where separate premiums were paid for each vehicle, where the terms of the policy applied separately to each vehicle, and where the actual damages incurred exceeded the maximum sum of those coverages. Prior to this decision, only inter-policy stacking was allowed in Connecticut. The Vetre case substantially enhanced the ability of injured persons to recover adequate compensation for losses which they suffered as the result of the negligence of uninsured or underinsured motorists until January 1, 1994 when intra-policy stacking and inter-policy stacking was abolished by statute.
Rokus v. City of Bridgeport, 191 Conn. 62 (1983) — This case establises that evidence of subsequent repairs is admissable for a purpose
other than to prove negligence, e.g., to show the configuration of the streets and
adjacent sidewalks in an intersection.
Royston v. Factor, 1 Conn App. 576 (1984) — This case holds that a trier of facts can conclude, by inference, that an injury will be
permanent, particularly if the disability still exists two years after the accident, even
though there is no medical testimony expressly substantiating permanency.