Dahl v. MGMMIRAGE, A512447, District Court, Clark County, Nevada. — Carol Davis Zucker was co-counsel for the successful employer in obtaining summary judgment in a case involving construction of an executive-level employment contract. The court''''s ruling involved construction and standards of proof of a "just cause" for termination provision. Approximately $1 million was at issue. This is an important precedent for informal citation to district courts.
Marcoz v. Summa Corporation, 106 Nev. 737, 801 Pl2d 1346 (1990) — Carol Davis Zucker was counsel for the successful employer in a case of first impression in Nevada on the tort claim for bad faith discharge from employment. While the Nevada Supreme Court had previous found to exist a narrowly-delineated claim for tortious bad faith discharge where an employee was terminated in order to deprive him of retirement benefits, the Supreme Court in Marcoz significantly limited that tort. The Court held that, where the retirement plan was covered by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (as are most such plans), the tortious discharge claim is preempted by ERISA. The importance of that case is shown by the fact the court has not expaneded the bad faith discharge claim since Marcoz.
Breeden v. Clark County School District, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) — Carol Davis Zucker was lead counsel for the successful employer before the United States Supreme Court. Winning the case at the Writ of Certiorari stage, the case established imporant precedents for Title VII workplace retaliation cases, including proof standards, as well as sexual harassment cases. The case has become an important precedent (cited frequently in decisions and briefs) defining the role in proof of retaliation of the "timing" element in retaliation cases, holding that where an employer action is contemplated before the employee engages in protected activity, the resulting action is not retaliatory as a matter of law. The Court also held that the plaintiff''s report of alleged sexual harassment was not reasonable as a matter of law, stating that conduct must be "extremely serious" to be considered "sexual harassment."